What Happened...
The Battle of Prairie Grove, December 7, 1862
From Rugged and Sublime: The Civil War in Arkansas;
Courtesy of the Department of Arkansas Heritage
Since the beginning of 1862, the Confederates had only reacted to
Federal moves, but Hindman was greatly encouraged by what he saw as his
success in forcing Curtis away from Little Rock. He convinced Holmes to
allow him to seize the strategic initiative in northwestern Arkansas and
southwestern Missouri. At Fort Smith Hindman struggled to train and equip
the recruits and unwilling conscripts that made up the First Corps. Progress
was excruciatingly slow because arms, ammunition, clothing, equipment,
wagons, draft animals, and food were in short supply. Hindman grew impatient
and led a small force into southwestern Missouri. He had barely established
his headquarters in Pineville, Missouri, before Holmes called him to Little
Rock for a conference. In mid-September Hindman reluctantly returned to
Arkansas and left Brig. Gen. James S. Rains in command in Missouri.
As luck would have it, Holmes recalled Hindman at the worst possible
moment. On September 19 Curtis, now a major general, succeeded Halleck
as commander of the Department of the Missouri; Steele in turn succeeded
Curtis as commander of the Federal garrison at Helena. In surveying the
situation from his new headquarters in St. Louis, Curtis immediately noted
Hindman's presence in the state. Curtis had swept Price's army out of southwestern
Missouri eight months earlier, and he was absolutely determined to prevent
the Confederates from reestablishing themselves in that region. He directed
his principal subordinate, Brig. Gen. John M. Schofield, to clean the Rebels
out of Missouri once and for all. In effect, Curtis gave Schofield the
same task Halleck had assigned Curtis the previous December. The primary
difference was that after Pea Ridge the focus of the war in the TransMississippi
had shifted eastward to the banks of the Mississippi River, where the titanic
struggle for Vicksburg was underway. The resources available to both sides
to carry out major military operations on the frontier were smaller than
at the beginning of the year. Another difference was that Schofield had
much less military ability than Curtis.
Schofield hastily gathered together a composite force that he called
the Army of the Frontier. After several weeks of confused campaigning during
which both Schofield and Rains demonstrated their incapacity for independent
command, the Federals finally pushed the scattered Confederate detachments
back into Arkansas and the Indian Territory. The Army of the Frontier entered
northwestern Arkansas on October 18 and briefly occupied Fayetteville,
Bentonville, and Cross Hollows. The only engagement of note in or near
Arkansas occurred just west of Maysville on October 22 when Brig. Gen.
James G. Blunt's Federal division attacked and routed a small force of
Confederate Indians commanded by Col. Douglas H. Cooper.
Early in November Schofield fell back to Springfield with two of
his three divisions, but left Blunt's division in the northwestern corner
of Arkansas. On November 20 Schofield became ill and returned to St. Louis.
Command of the scattered Army of the Frontier passed to Blunt, a self-confident
and aggressive amateur soldier from Kansas. Emboldened by his success at
Maysville, Blunt led his division south down the Military Road that ran
along the border between Arkansas and the Indian Territory. The other two
Federal divisions, commanded by Brig. Gen. Francis J. Herron of Pea Ridge
fame, remained near Springfield. By the end of November, the main components
of the Army of the Frontier were dangerously far apart.
Hindman returned to Fort Smith and learned of the inviting disposition
of the Army of the Frontier. He decided to try to cross the Boston Mountains
undetected and overwhelm Blunt's isolated division before Herron could
react. If everything turned out as he hoped, the road to Missouri would
be open once again. Back in Little Rock, Holmes continued to be extremely
concerned about the danger of a Federal offensive from the east. His anxiety
mounted when Confederate authorities in Richmond urged him to send ten
thousand men to Vicksburg at once. Then he learned of Hindman's bold plan
to march north. It was all too much for Holmes; he refused to allow any
of his troops to leave Arkansas. "The invasion of Missouri is interdicted,"
he told Hindman, "so make your arrangements to give up that darling project."
Hindman assured Holmes that the planned attack on Blunt was a limited offensive
that did not presage an invasion of Missouri and that regardless of the
outcome of the operation he would return to Fort Smith. Considering Hindman's
nature, and his disdain for the ineffectual Holmes, Hindman may not have
been entirely honest.
The initial phase of the Confederate offensive did not go as planned.
Brig. Gen. John S. Marmaduke led a cavalry force of about two thousand
men across the Boston Mountains to distract Blunt and to screen Hindman's
advance. To Marmaduke's surprise, Blunt rushed forward to meet him with
a force of five thousand men and thirty cannons. The two unequal columns
collided on November 28 at Cane Hill. The Federals used flanking maneuvers
and superior artillery to drive the Confederates from one position after
another. The nine-hour running fight swept across twelve miles of forested
ridges and valleys. As was often the case in the Civil War when mobile
mounted forces were engaged, casualties were light: the Federals lost nine
killed, thirty-two wounded, and a small number missing; Confederate losses
were slightly higher.
Marmaduke was pushed back across the Boston Mountains to Dripping
Springs before Hindman could ferry the main body of his army across the
Arkansas River from Fort Smith to Van Buren. Hindman was not particularly
upset, however, because he realized that the engagement at Cane Hill had
drawn the aggressive Blunt thirty-five miles deeper into Arkansas. Blunt's
division now was located at the northern edge of the Boston Mountains,
nearly one hundred miles from Herron's two divisions near Springfield,
but only thirty miles from Hindman's army at Van Buren. Blunt was more
vulnerable than ever and Hindman believed it was imperative that the Confederates
take advantage of this extraordinary opportunity.
On December 3, Hindman led the eleven thousand men and twenty-two
cannons of the First Corps of the Army of the Trans-Mississippi north toward
the Boston Mountains. The ragged Rebels who tramped out of Van Buren exemplified
Van Dorn's crippling legacy to the Trans-Mississippi: the First Corps was
a makeshift army thrown together and rushed into battle without adequate
training and equipment. Many men were conscripts of dubious reliability.
They were armed with a reasonably effective mix of rifles, smoothbores,
and shotguns, but they carried only enough ammunition for a single day
of combat. The artillery was unimpressive even by Confederate standards.
Draft animals were emaciated due to a lack of forage, and the small number
of rickety wagons that composed the train could not support the army in
the field for more than a few days.
Hindman was optimistic despite the obvious weaknesses in his command.
His plan was simple: Marmaduke would advance across the Boston Mountains
once again and create a diversion by threatening Cane Hill from the south.
With Blunt's attention fixed on Marmaduke, Hindman and the main body of
the First Corps would swing around Blunt's left flank and strike him from
the east. The Federals would be overwhelmed on the spot or be driven into
the wilderness of the Indian Territory, where they would be without hope
of supply or succor. It was a sound plan on paper, but it demanded a great
deal of inexperienced officers and men and relied heavily on an extremely
fragile logistical system. Thus began the final Confederate offensive in
northwestern Arkansas.
Blunt was headstrong and belligerent, but he was no fool. He realized
that his advanced position practically invited an attack, so he kept a
close watch on Confederate activity in western Arkansas. On December 2,
the day before the First Corps marched out of Van Buren, Blunt concluded
that something was afoot. He telegraphed Herron to march immediately to
his support. Despite the gravity of the situation, Blunt did not fall back
toward Missouri. Instead, he placed his troops in defensive positions around
Cane Hill and prepared for a fight. Three days passed as the anxious Federals
waited for the slow-moving Confederate column to cross the Boston Mountains.
On December 6, Marmaduke's cavalry finally emerged from Cove Creek
Valley and clashed with Federal cavalry near Reed's Mountain. While this
noisy diversion was in progress, Hindman led his infantry and artillery
around to the east of Cane Hill. The Confederates inched forward at an
agonizingly slow pace, hampered by fatigue, confusion, primitive roads,
failing draft animals, and disintegrating wagons and artillery vehicles.
Nevertheless, events generally were unfolding according to plan, if not
on schedule. Then, during the night of December 6-7, Hindman learned that
Herron had left Springfield with his entire force and was hastening to
Blunt's relief on Telegraph Road. Hindman realized he could not attack
Blunt from the east and expose his rear to Herron. He decided instead to
move around Blunt's left as originally planned, but to continue north and
intercept Herron before he could reach Cane Hill. He intended to defeat
Herron somewhere near Fayetteville, then turn back and deal with Blunt.
The hastily revised plan required Hindman's Confederates to march
farther and faster than originally anticipated. It also ignored the fact
that they did not have enough ammunition to fight two battles. Finally,
it meant that most of Marmaduke's cavalry would have to accompany the main
body, leaving only a small force near Reed's Mountain to keep Blunt occupied.
Hindman was not averse to taking risks. Now, as so often before in his
civilian and military career, he would attempt to accomplish much with
little.
Early the next morning, December 7, the Confederates struck out across
the rolling terrain north of the Boston Mountains, giving a wide berth
to Blunt's position at Cane Hill. The troops moved so slowly even Hindman
reported that it was painful to observe the exhaustion of the men. Straggling
became epidemic, and the train fell far behind. Shortly after sunrise Marmaduke's
cavalry division, riding several miles ahead of the sluggish infantry,
encountered a small Federal cavalry force near the Illinois River (west
of present-day Farmington). The Federals were the vanguard of Herron's
column. They were easily routed and retreated in disorder to the outskirts
of Fayetteville, where they reached the safety of Herron's main body.
The presence of Herron's two divisions at Fayetteville at that day
and hour was nothing short of miraculous. Herron received Blunt's message
late on December 3 and placed his troops in motion on Telegraph Road early
the next morning. During the next three days, the Federals marched a hundred
and ten miles-an average of almost thirty-five miles per day. Some units
covered the final sixty-six miles in only thirty hours. The march was one
of the extraordinary events of the war and an epic of human endurance.
Not every one of Herron's men was able to maintain the furious pace, however.
About seven thousand Federal soldiers set out at the beginning of the march
but only half that number were on their feet at the end. Hundreds of those
feet were bare, for many men either wore out their shoes along the way
or found it more comfortable to do without them. Fortunately for both sides,
the weather throughout the campaign was unseasonably mild for December.
Herron's attenuated column reached Fayetteville during the night of December
6-7, halted for a brief rest, then moved on at sunrise and encountered
Marmaduke's cavalry.
Marmaduke fell back before the inexorable advance of Herron' s weary,
footsore infantry. Ten miles west of Fayetteville the Confederate cavalry
retired across the Illinois River and ascended a low wooded hill surrounded
by rolling grasslands. Atop the hill was a modest structure known as Prairie
Grove Presbyterian Church. Marmaduke halted to await the arrival of the
rest of the First Corps, which slowly came up from the south and deployed
along the hill facing north. By this stage of the campaign, the Confederates
had suffered considerable attrition as well, and the First Corps probably
consisted of fewer than nine thousand men. Hindman reached Prairie Grove
at mid-morning with the intention of attacking Herron's force, but his
men trickled in so slowly it would be afternoon before he had sufficient
strength to do the job. Then his scouts reported that Blunt was stirring
at Cane Hill and preparing to march. The Confederate commander was almost
as worn out as his soldiers, and this latest information seemed to deflate
him. Afraid that if he went after Herron, Blunt would strike him in the
rear, Hindman simply stopped at Prairie Grove, unable to decide upon an
appropriate course of action in this crisis.
Hindman first attempted to attack Blunt at Cane Hill before Herron
arrived in support, then he attempted to attack Herron at Fayetteville
before Blunt realized what was happening. Both efforts failed because of
Herron's alacrity and Hindman's unrealistic expectations of what his army
could accomplish. Now the tired, hungry, and poorly equipped Confederates
were between two converging Federal forces whose combined strength was
roughly equal to their own. And those Federal forces were led by two of
the most combative officers in the Department of the Missouri. The coming
battle would determine whether the First Corps of the Army of the Trans-Mississippi
would survive to return to Van Buren.
During the morning of December 7, Herron and his two shrunken divisions
forded the Illinois River and deployed on Crawford's Prairie opposite the
Confederate right. Herron was outnumbered better than two to one and his
line was less than half as long as the Confederate line. Moreover, his
men-the thirty-five hundred or so who were still with him-were hardly in
the best condition for a grueling fight. Undaunted, Herron ordered his
twenty-four rifled cannons into action against the lighter Confederate
artillery planted on the forward slope of the hill. Around ten o'clock
the Federal artillery roared to life and began "Spitting Fire and Smoke
Shell and Shot in to the Secesh Ranks." The bombardment lasted two hours.
By noon all of the Confederate guns on Hindman's right had been disabled
or abandoned, and most of the Confederate infantry and dismounted cavalry
had taken cover on the reverse slope of the hill. The devastating bombardment
was another stunning demonstration of the superiority of Federal artillery
in the Trans-Mississippi.
When the Confederate batteries fell silent and the infantry disappeared
from sight, Herron mistakenly assumed that the Confederates had retreated.
He ordered four small regiments forward. The Federals advanced across Crawford's
Prairie and up the wooded slope, easily overrunning an abandoned Rebel
battery. They continued on past Archibald Borden's house and reached an
orchard on the crest of the hill. There they were met by a furious counterattack
and "a perfect hail storm of bullets" from two divisions of Confederate
troops commanded by Marmaduke and Brig. Gen. Francis A. Shoup. Half of
the Federals were killed or wounded within minutes. The Rebels then advanced
from three sides and drove the surviving Federals back down the hill in
disarray. "As we came off the field the bullets were flying seemingly as
thick as hail and nearly every one was struck either in his person or clothing,"
wrote an Indiana soldier. "I was one of three in my company who did not
receive a mark of a bullet." Wildly yelling Confederates, barely under
the control of their officers, swept down the slope and across the prairie
after the fleeing Federals, only to be cut down in heaps by Herron's artillery.
Despite the bloody repulse of the spontaneous Confederate counterattack
on Crawford's Prairie, Hindman saw his chance. With the Federal infantry
decimated by the slaughter around the Borden house on the Confederate right,
he had only to wheel forward his center and left and overwhelm Herron's
command. A quick decisive victory might be possible after all. It was mid-afternoon,
however, before the Confederates advanced down the slope toward the prairie.
As they commenced the maneuvers required to swing around to approach Herron's
position, they were struck by artillery fire from the northwest. Blunt's
division was on the field.
Blunt passed most of the morning at Cane Hill wondering why Hindman
did not attack. When he heard the roar of artillery in the direction of
Fayetteville, he belatedly realized that Hindman had gotten around his
flank and intercepted Herron. Furious at having been fooled, Blunt immediately
marched toward the sound of the guns. It was fortunate for the Union cause
in the Trans-Mississippi that he did so, for he arrived on the battlefield
in the nick of time. Blunt's division deployed opposite Brig. Gen. Daniel
M. Frost's division on the Confederate left, which was just beginning to
move toward Herron. Blunt unleashed his artillery against the surprised
Confederates and drove them back to the hill. He then sent his fresh infantry
forward. Severe fighting raged around the William Morton house at the base
of the hill, but the Federals were unable to dislodge the numerically superior
Confederates and eventually fell back. Frost's men sensed victory and pursued
the Federals onto the prairie, but were "mowed down like grass with canister
and grape" from Blunt's massed artillery. The bloody repulse of the Confederate
counterattack was a reprise of what had occurred a few hours earlier on
Herron's part of the battlefield. Confederate survivors retreated back
up the wooded slope and remained there for the duration of the battle.
Late in the afternoon, Blunt and Herron made contact and thereafter presented
a continuous front to the enemy. Neither army was able to dislodge the
other and there were no more major assaults, though artillery fire and
volleys of musketry raged along the line until dark .
During the night of December 7-8, Blunt ordered up three thousand
cavalrymen whom he had held in reserve at Rhea's Mill to guard his train.
Hundreds of footsore but determined Federal stragglers, barefoot or otherwise,
limped in from Missouri and rejoined Herron. Hindman had no reserves to
call upon, and his stragglers either deserted or drifted back to Van Buren.
Moreover, his artillery had been devastated, his train was miles to the
rear, and his men were low on ammunition and out of food. There was nothing
to do but withdraw under cover of darkness. The weary soldiers of the battered
First Corps quietly slipped away from the battlefield, leaving behind their
dead and most of their wounded. They trudged back across the Boston Mountains
and reached Van Buren on December 10, a pathetic remnant of a ragtag army.
If Pea Ridge was an extended boxing match in which the combatants
weaved and jabbed, Prairie Grove was a short, brutal, slugging match in
which the two sides traded direct frontal assaults until both were exhausted.
"For the forces engaged, there was no more stubborn fight and no greater
casualties in any battle of the war than at Prairie Grove, Arkansas," declared
a Federal officer. He was correct. The toll for both sides was severe.
The Federals went into battle with fewer than 8,000 men and suffered 1,261
casualties: 175 killed, 813 wounded, and 263 missing. Most of the losses
occurred in the terrible fighting around the Borden house. Confederate
numbers are problematic, as always. The Confederates had no more than 9,000
men on the battlefield and suffered at least 1,317 casualties: 164 killed,
817 wounded, and 336 missing. Actual Rebel losses almost certainly were
higher. A reasonable conclusion is that each army lost over 15 percent
of the troops engaged. In addition to men struck down in the battle, the
Confederates experienced serious desertion of conscripts during the campaign.
Several hundred of these deserters, mostly northern Arkansans who opposed
secession, changed sides after the battle and enrolled in Arkansas Union
regiments.
In late December Blunt learned that Schofield had recovered his health
and was on his way to resume command of the Army of the Frontier. For several
weeks Blunt had toyed with the idea of a raid to the Arkansas River. He
believed that such an operation would disrupt the Confederate logistical
base at Fort Smith and Van Buren and make it impossible for Hindman to
launch another campaign into northwestern Arkansas or southwestern Missouri
in the foreseeable future. Blunt feared that the ambitious but inept Schofield
would shoulder him aside and fritter away this opportunity. After conferring
with Herron, who enthusiastically supported the plan, Blunt decided to
act while he still commanded the Army of the Frontier.
On December 27 Blunt and Herron led eight thousand men and thirty
cannons on a rapid march across the Boston Mountains. The Federals made
surprisingly good time on the primitive roads that had caused the Confederates
so much grief. They stormed into Van Buren the next day, capturing over
one hundred surprised Rebels and scattering hundreds more in all directions.
The Federals looted the town, destroyed three steamboats and a ferry, and
burned a large amount of food and military stores. Hindman had only about
five thousand troops in the vicinity, most of them just across the river
in Fort Smith. He now regarded Blunt and Herron as formidable opponents
and had no desire to tangle with them again so soon after Prairie Grove.
He burned two Steamboats at Fort Smith and hastened down the south bank
of the Arkansas River toward Clarksville with what remained of the First
Corps. The Confederate exodus was so abrupt that between three and four
thousand Rebels were left behind in Fort Smith hospitals. As it turned
out, Blunt made no attempt to cross the river and reach Fort Smith. He
withdrew from Van Buren on December 29, his objective achieved. The Army
of the Frontier recrossed the Boston Mountains and returned to its camps
in northwestern Arkansas two days later. The Prairie Grove campaign was
over.
The course of events in northwestern Arkansas during the fall of
1862 was another unmitigated disaster for the Trans-Mississippi Confederacy.
Hindman's First Corps fought Blunt's Army of the Frontier to a costly tactical
draw at Prairie Grove, but the purpose of Hindman's offensive was to destroy
Blunt's isolated division and recover northwestern Arkansas and southwestern
Missouri. None of these strategic objectives was achieved. The First Corps,
assembled at such enormous cost in time, energy, and resources, was devastated
and its men dispirited. Prairie Grove also cost the Federals dearly, but
they succeeded in turning back the Confederates and defending the strategic
gains made earlier in the year.
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